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AUTISTIC SKEPTIC: Martial Law, FEMA Camps, Patriot Act, ect. Debunked!!!

Author: Clock
Date: Mar 29, 2013 at 10:24


I am Clock, I am not the author of this article, I am simply reposting it as the authors blog went down.

Repeat, I am not Autistic Skeptic
Please enjoy,


FEMA camps/Martial law DEBUNKED!!

1.What 'FEMA coffins' Really are.

A grave liner, also known as a burial liner, is an enclosure that is placed over a coffin containing human corpse, which is then buried in the ground. The casket serves as the inner enclosure of a deceased person; the liner serves as the outer enclosure. A burial liner is similar to a burial vault. The main difference between a burial vault and liner is that the liner only covers the top and sides of a casket, whereas a burial vault completely encloses a casket. In a burial liner, the bottom of the casket in this case is in direct contact with the ground. A burial liner serves to protect a casket during burial from being crushed and keeps the casket from being crushed when the heavy equipment that many modern cemeteries use pass over the grave. A liner helps keep the ground over the grave from sinking in, and helps keeps the ground even. To prevent sunken graves, many modern cemeteries require that either a burial liner or vault be used in burials. The use of burial liners is typical only in recent American history and is unheard of outside of the United States. The alternative to using a burial liner is to pile the earth up over the grave in order to allow for settling as is the practice in Europe and other parts of the world. For example, in the UK burial liners are never used because the inevitable subsidence of the earth over a grave is not viewed as a major problem: as the ground subsides over a number of years, earth is added to the depression to level it. Green cemeteries and some religions discourage the use of liners as they slow down the return of the body to the earth. A burial vault is a container that houses a casket when it is buried. The burial vault is placed in the grave, the casket is lowered into the vault and a top (lid) is placed onto the vault before the grave is covered. The purpose of the burial vault is to protect the casket from the weight of the earth and the equipment used in the maintenance of the cemetery property. Burial vaults also maintain the beauty of the cemetery by eliminating soil settlement. Burial vaults are most commonly made from concrete, but are also made from steel and plastic. The burial container known as a grave liner is not the same as a burial vault. The burial vault completely encloses the casket while a grave liner has no bottom or holes in the bottom. The present day funeral industry emerged in the aftermath of the American Civil War. At that time burial vaults were made from brick. The grave would be lined with bricks and the coffin would be placed inside and covered. Around the turn of the century the American funeral industry began to pick up steam and Americans' experience of death and body disposal was transformed. In the late 1880s companies began to manufacture a two - piece concrete burial vault. As the American funeral industry continued to grow, and gain respect as a reputable business, so did the burial vault industry. Burial vaults continued to be improved and in the late 1920s companies began to coat them with asphalt to keep moisture away from the casket. The growing demand for burial vaults led to the creation of The National Concrete Burial Vault Association (NCBVA) in the 1930 as a non-profit organization of concrete burial manufactures in the United States and Canada. As of 2009 the NCBVA has 350 independent concrete burial vault manufactures. The total number of burial vault manufactures is not known due to the fact that this organization is limited to only concrete burial vault manufactures (not plastic and steel) and not all manufactures are members. Just as with any product, over the last century burial vaults have continued to be improved. Now burial vaults are built to withstand up to 5000 pounds psf and are available in a variety of finishes and also liners to keep moisture from the casket.

2.NDAA myths debunked.
Does the NDAA expand the government's detention authority?

Nope. Under current law, the Obama administration claims the authority to detain: (

persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.

That claim of authority is based on the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") passed by Congress shortly after the September 11 attacks, as informed by the law of war. The Bush Administration previously claimed very similar authority, albeit invoking not just the AUMF but also the inherent power of the President under Article II of the Constitution. In any event, such claims have been subjected to judicial challenge repeatedly, most commonly in the context of the Guantanamo detainee habeas litigation. As we explain below, the courts have had a decidedly mixed reaction in the pair of cases involving persons captured within the United States, but as for persons captured abroad, they have largely endorsed the government's position. The D.C. Circuit, in fact, has tentatively adopted a definition of the class detainable under the AUMF that is, if anything, broader than what the administration seeks. While the administration--and now Congress--would detain only on the basis of "substantial support," the D.C. Circuit has articulated a standard which would permit detention of those who "purposefully and materially support" the enemy, even if not substantially.

In light of all this, a law that writes the administration's successful litigating position into statute cannot reasonably be said to expand the government's detention authority. In fact, to the extent that the new statutory language will preempt the arguably broader D.C. Circuit definition, it may actually narrow it--if only very slightly. So let's compare the language of the administration's claimed authority (quoted above) to the language of the NDAA:

(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.

(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.

They are almost verbatim the same. The NDAA is really a codification in statute of the existing authority the administration claims. It puts Congress's stamp of approval behind that claim for the first time, and that's no small thing. But it does not--notwithstanding the widespread belief to the contrary--expand it. Nobody who is not subject to detention today will become so when the NDAA goes into effect.

The one area in which the NDAA could theoretically be said to expand detention authority involves people held on the basis not of membership in an enemy group but mere support for one. As noted above, the government has long claimed this authority already, and the DC Circuit has in fact endorsed a slightly broader formulation. But so far, anyway, it has done so in dicta only--that is, not in any case where the fact pattern actually depended on the resolution of that issue. In theory, then, the circuit (or the Supreme Court) might at some point have concluded that support alone is insufficient to support a detention. The NDAA will ensure that this does not happen by making clear that independent support does count as a ground for detention (or at least it will do so as a matter of statutory interpretation; in theory, the door would remain open to some form of constitutional challenge, though it is difficult to see how that would work). So even as it marginally narrows the detainable class, the NDAA also tends to ensure that courts will not narrow the scope of that class further.

Does the NDAA authorize the indefinite detention of citizens?

No, though it does not foreclose the possibility either. Congress ultimately included language in the NDAA expressly designed to leave this question untouched--that is, governed by pre-existing law, which as we explain below is unsettled on this question.

The confusion associated with the NDAA's treatment of the citizenship issue is understandable. First, the NDAA's text relevant to this question changed quite a bit over time. Second, the relationship of the NDAA to pre-existing detention authority is difficult to follow if one does not keep up with this area regularly. So let's begin with an overview of that pre-existing authority, before turning to the NDAA itself.

During the administration of George W. Bush, the government used its detention authority under the AUMF (described above) in two instances involving U.S. citizens. The first involved Yaser Hamdi, who was captured by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan in late 2001 and then later turned over to U.S. forces. He was at GTMO when the government determined he had a claim to US citizenship by virtue of having been born in Louisiana, and accordingly the government moved him to a military facility within the United States. A habeas proceeding followed, and ultimately went all the way to the Supreme Court. In 2004, the Court held that (i) the government's authority to detain under the AUMF at least included armed members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan (at least so long as fighting continued there), (ii) citizenship was no bar to detention in that circumstance, and (iii) citizenship did, however, entitle a detainee to a fair opportunity to contest the factual claims asserted by the government in support of detention.

Meanwhile, the government had arrested a suspected al Qaeda member--and U.S. citizen--named Jose Padilla, taking him into custody at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. He eventually ended up in military custody, and he too brought a habeas proceeding. To make a long story very short, his case first proceeded through the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a panel of which concluded that detention authority under the AUMF did not apply to a citizen suspected of being an al Qaeda member and captured in the U.S. After the Supreme Court required the petition to be refiled and relitigated in the Fourth Circuit (because that is where Padilla actually was held), a district court judge took the same position, but on appeal a Fourth Circuit panel held that Padilla could lawfully be detained after all--though in so holding, the panel focused on the factual assumption that Padilla had, like Hamdi, been on the battlefield in Afghanistan previously. The case was then set to go before the Supreme Court, but before it could weigh in on the merits, Padilla was shifted into civilian custody for a criminal trial (he was convicted, and is now in prison).

The government has not asserted authority to detain a citizen under the AUMF since this time, so the question of citizen detention has remained unsettled ever since. Which brings us at last to the NDAA.

An earlier version of the NDAA in the Senate contained language that strongly implied, without quite saying it, that citizens were included within the general grant of detention authority discussed above (see Bobby's contemporaneous assessment here [1]). This generated much debate and criticism, and eventually a group of senators offered an amendment to state explicitly that citizens could not be detained under the NDAA's restatement of detention authority. That amendment was rejected, and at that point, Senator Feinstein offered a compromise, fall-back amendment stating simply that nothing in the NDAA should be taken to address this issue one way or the other. The explicit idea was to preserve the unsettled status quo described above, leaving it to the courts to determine if detention authority extends to citizens should the government ever again attempt to assert it (see here [2] and here [3] ). That is the position on which the NDAA has now settled (here [4] ).

A final note: As Steve points out here [5], the courts may in the end adopt a "clear statement" requirement in relation to the citizen detention question. That is, they may hold that Congress must explicitly grant such authority before a statute like the AUMF or the NDAA can be read to grant it. If that occurs, of course, that likely will be the end of the matter, particularly in light of the explicit effort in the NDAA to remain agnostic rather than take sides on the question.

Does it repeal the Bill of Rights?

No federal statute can repeal the Bill of Rights. To the extent any provision of the NDAA is found to conflict with any provision of the Bill of Rights, it will not survive constitutional scrutiny.

So if it doesn't significantly expand the government's detention authority, doesn't authorize detention of citizens, doesn't really mandate the military detention of other terrorist suspects, and doesn't do more to prevent the closure of Gitmo than does current law, what's all the fuss about? Is it even important?

The final bill is, indeed, far less consequential than earlier versions would have been. Much of the fuss is overblown. That said, the bill has several important elements:

The codification of detention authority in statute is a significant development, not because it enables anything that Congress had previously forbidden but because it puts the legislature squarely behind a set of policies on which it had always retained a kind of strategic ambiguity--a tolerance for detention without a clear endorsement of it of the sort that would make members accountable. Congress has now given that endorsement, and that is no small thing.

The transfer restrictions will continue to have negative effects on administration management of detainee affairs, reducing flexibility and agility and compelling the continued detention of people the administration does not want to detain, in a status the administration does not wish to use, and at a facility it would prefer to vacate. That this is no change from current law--indeed, that the NDAA offers slightly more flexibility than does current law--does not make these restrictions any less troublesome.

The rump mandatory detention provision remains a bit of a wild card that could have mischievous effects in practice. Though it ends up requiring very little, it does impose--as we have described--a default option of military detention for certain categories of cases. And this option might prove politically difficult to jettison.

Is there anything in the NDAA about which human rights groups and civil libertarians ought to be pleased?

Yes, actually, there is. Section 1024 of the bill, as we've noted, requires that people subject to long-term military detention in circumstances not already subject to habeas corpus review--think the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan--henceforth shall have the right to a military lawyer and a proceeding before a military judge in order to contest the government's factual basis for believing them to be subject to detention.
This is an extraordinary and novel development. Detainees in Afghanistan currently have access to the Detainee Review Board process, which as described in this article [6] already provide a relatively robust screening mechanism, particularly compared to years past. The DRB process does not include lawyers and judges, however, and human rights advocacy groups have criticized them on this ground. Requiring lawyers and judges to staff out the screening process is a pretty remarkable shift in the direction of accommodating those concerns.

What's more, while human rights groups have decried the codification of detention authority, the codification does preclude certain interpretations of the AUMF that human rights groups hated. For example, while the difference between the D.C. Circuit's embrace of the "purposefully and materially support" standard and the administration's language seems pretty slight, the D.C. Circuit language did--which the NDAA now jettisons--keep critics up at night [7]. And the D.C. Circuit famously flirted in one case with the notion that international law does not inform or limit detention authority under the AUMF--a position that the explicit references to the "law of war" in the NDAA seems to reject

3.Patriot act myths.

Quotations used by


Permits sharing of grand jury and wiretap information regarding foreign intelligence with federal law-enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national-defense and national-security personnel.


"While some sharing of information may be appropriate in some limited circumstances, it should only be done with strict safeguards. . . . The bill lacks all of these safeguards. As a result it may lead to the very abuses that the Church Committee exposed decades ago." [American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Oct. 23, 2001]



, federal law sharply limited the ability of federal law-enforcement to share terrorism-related information with national-defense officials and members of the intelligence community in order to protect the American People from terrorism. As the recent 9/11 Congressional Joint Inquiry Report confirms, prior to September 11th our ability to connect the dots was inhibited by the inability to coordinate throughout our own government.

For example, suppose that a federal prosecutor learned during grand jury testimony that terrorists were planning to detonate a nuclear bomb in Manhattan in the next 30 minutes. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) would have prevented him from immediately notifying national-security officials.

Section 203 facilitated a coordinated, integrated antiterrorism campaign by allowing the sharing of information acquired by wiretaps or through grand jury proceedings. Thanks to section 203, the right hand now knows what the left hand is doing.

Section 203 contains a number of privacy safeguards. An individual who receives any information under this section can use it only "in the conduct of that person's official duties." And any time grand jury information is shared, the government is required to notify the supervising court.

On September 23, 2002, the Attorney General issued privacy guidelines governing the sharing of information that identifies a United States person. These rules require that all such information be labeled before disclosure, and handled according to specific protocols designed to ensure its appropriate use.

The Department has made disclosures of vital information to the intelligence community and other federal officials under section 203 on dozens of occasions.

The authority to share wiretap information will sunset on December 31, 2005. The authority to share grand jury information will not sunset.

Section 206. Roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.


Allows FISA court to authorize "roving surveillance" when it finds that the target's actions may thwart the identification of a communications company or other person whose assistance may be needed to carry out the surveillance.


"These wiretaps pose a greater challenge to privacy because they are authorized secretly without a showing of probable cause of crime.This Section represents a broad expansion of power without building in a necessary privacy protection." [ACLU, Oct. 23, 2001]


For years, law enforcement has been able to use "roving wiretaps"

- in which a wiretap authorization attaches to a particular suspect, rather than a particular communications device - to investigate ordinary crimes, including drug offenses and racketeering. The authority to use roving wiretaps in drug cases has existed since 1986.

Section 206 authorized the same techniques in national-security investigations. This provision has enhanced the government's authority to monitor sophisticated international terrorists and intelligence officers, who are trained to thwart surveillance, such as by rapidly changing cell phones, just before important meetings or communications.

A wiretap under section 206 can be ordered only after the FISA court makes a finding that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the surveillance.

A number of federal courts - including the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits - have squarely ruled that roving wiretaps are perfectly consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

Whether the Department has used section 206 is classified. Details about its use were provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 29, 2003, in response to a request by the House Committee on the Judiciary.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 209. Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants.


Allows law enforcement to obtain voice mail stored with a third party provider by using a search warrant, rather than a wiretap order.


Under previous law, law enforcement could use a search warrant to obtain voice messages stored on an answering machine inside a terrorist's home. But agents had to go through the burdensome process of obtaining a wiretap order if the same messages were stored with a third party provider.

Section 209 allowed investigators, upon a showing of probable cause, to use court-issued search warrants to obtain voicemails held by a third-party provider. Simply put, the law now treats these voicemail messages the same as voicemails on a home answering machine.

Section 209 preserved all of the pre-existing standards for the availability of search warrants. For example, law enforcement still must: (1) apply for and receive a court order; and (2) establish probable cause that criminal activity is afoot.

Since passage of the Act, such warrants have been used in a variety of criminal cases to obtain key evidence, including voicemail messages left for foreign and domestic terrorists.

Under previous law, the wiretap statute governed access to stored wire communications such as voicemail, because the definition of "wire communication" (18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)) included stored communications.

This provision will sunset December 31, 2005.

Section 210. Scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications.


Broadens the types of records that grand juries can subpoena from electronic communications providers to include the means and source of payment, such as bank accounts and credit card numbers.



, federal law allowed grand juries to subpoena a limited class of information from electronic-communications providers. Grand juries could not subpoena certain information - such as credit card and bank account numbers - that is indispensable in tracking down a suspect's true identity.

Section 210 updated the law

by allowing grand juries to subpoena the full range of information necessary to determine suspects' identities. Now, grand juries can issue subpoenas for the means of payment that customers use to pay for their accounts. That includes "any credit card or bank account number."

This information will prove particularly valuable in identifying the users of Internet services where a company does not verify its users' biographical information.

Prosecutors in the field report that this new authority has allowed for quick tracing of suspects in numerous important cases, including several terrorism investigations and a case in which computer hackers attacked over fifty government and military computers.

As is true of all subpoenas, recipients of a section 210 subpoena can go to court and ask the judge to quash it. And, if the recipient refuses to comply with a section 210 subpoena, the government must ask a judge to enforce it; agents cannot enforce it unilaterally.

Before section 210, grand jury subpoenas of electronic-communications providers generally were limited to obtaining customers' names, addresses, and length of service.

Section 211. Clarification of scope.


Clarifies that the statutes governing telephone and Internet communications - not the burdensome provisions of the Cable Act - apply to cable companies that provide Internet or telephone service.


Before the USA PATRIOT Act, some cable companies, citing restrictions in the federal Cable Act, ignored lawful court orders requiring them to turn over records about their customers' Internet or telephone use - even though any other Internet or telephone provider would have had to comply.

Section 211 clarified that when a cable company provides telephone or Internet service, it must comply with the same disclosure laws that apply to any other telephone company or Internet service provider.

Terrorists no longer can exempt themselves from lawful investigations simply by choosing cable companies as their communications providers.

Section 211 preserved all of the pre-existing standards in the applicable electronic-surveillance laws.

If agents want to use a pen register or trap-and-trace device (which record the numbers a telephone dials and from which it receives calls, but do not allow agents to listen to or record the contents of communications) or use a wiretap to listen to a cable customer's phone conversations, they still must apply for and receive a court order.

If agents want to use a wiretap, they must establish probable cause that criminal activity is afoot.

Section 212. Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and limb.


Allows computer-service providers to disclose communications in life-threatening emergencies.


Before USA PATRIOT, communications providers could not disclose records about their customers in emergency situations. If an Internet service provider learned that a customer was about to commit a terrorist attack, and notified law enforcement, it could be subject to civil lawsuits - even if the disclosure saved lives.

Section 212 allows communications providers voluntarily to turn over information in emergencies without fear of civil liability. Now, providers are permitted - but not required - to give law enforcement information in emergencies involving a risk of death or serious injury.

This is the equivalent of allowing citizens to tell police that, while walking down a public street, they overheard two people discussing a crime they were about to commit and decided to notify the police.

Section 212 does not impose an affirmative obligation to review customer communications in search of such imminent dangers.

Communications providers have used this new authority to disclose vital information to law enforcement in a number of important investigations, including a bomb threat against a high school.

An anonymous person posted on an Internet message board a bomb death threat that specifically named a faculty member and several students.

The message board's owner initially resisted giving law enforcement any information about the suspect for fear that he could be sued. Once agents explained section 212, the owner turned over evidence that led to the timely arrest of the individual responsible for the bomb threat.

The message board's owner later revealed that he had been worried for the safety of the students and teachers for several days, and expressed his relief that the USA PATRIOT Act permitted him to help.

Section 212 also played a key role in a case where two unknown individuals, using a U.S.-based email account, threatened to kill executives at a company in another country unless they were paid a hefty ransom. The email provider used section 212 to disclose key information about the suspects. The Justice Department then transmitted this information to the authorities in that country, less than two hours after we were first contacted. Both suspects later were apprehended overseas.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 213. Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant.


Allows courts, in certain narrow circumstances, to give delayed notice that a search warrant has been executed.


"It expands the government's ability to search private property without notice to the owner." [ACLU, Apr. 3, 2003]


Delayed notification warrants are a long-existing, crime-fighting tool upheld by courts nationwide for decades in organized crime, drug cases and child pornography.

Section 213 of USA PATRIOT Act simply codified the authority law enforcement already had for decades. Because of differences between jurisdictions, the law was a mix of inconsistent standards that varied widely across the country. This lack of uniformity hindered complex terrorism cases. Section 213 resolved the problem by establishing a uniform statutory standard. Section 213 is a vital aspect of our strategy of prevention - detecting and incapacitating terrorists before they are able to strike.

The Supreme Court has held the Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement to give immediate notice of the execution of a search warrant.

The Supreme Court emphasized "that covert entries are constitutional in some circumstances, at least if they are made pursuant to a warrant." In fact, the Court stated that an argument to the contrary was "frivolous." Dalia v. U.S., 441 U.S. 238 (1979). In yet another case, the Court said, "officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

If the Otter Amendment, passed in the House July 22, 2003, becomes law, it would have a devastating effect on our ongoing efforts to detect and prevent terrorism, as well as to combat other serious crimes. This amendment could tip off terrorists or criminals to investigations before law enforcement could obtain the needed information to locate their terrorists or criminal associates, identify and disrupt their plans, or initiate their arrests.

Premature notification of a search warrant could result in the intimidation of witnesses, destruction of evidence, flight from prosecution, physical injury, and even death.

In all cases, section 213 requires law enforcement to give notice that property has been searched or seized. It simply allows agents to temporarily delay when the required notification is given.

This authority can be used only upon the issuance of a court order, in extremely narrow circumstances. Courts can delay notice only when immediate notification may result in death or physical harm to an individual, flight from prosecution, evidence tampering, or witness intimidation.

Under section 213, courts can delay notice if there is "reasonable cause" to believe that immediate notification may have a specified adverse result. The "reasonable cause" standard is consistent with pre-PATRIOT Act caselaw for delayed notice of warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (government must show "good reason" for delayed notice of warrants).

Section 213 is important to law-enforcement investigations of a wide variety of serious crimes, including domestic and international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and child pornography.

In United States v. Odeh, a recent narco-terrorism case, a court issued a section 213 warrant in connection with the search of an envelope that had been mailed to a target of an investigation. The search confirmed that the target was operating a hawala money exchange that was used to funnel money to the Middle East, including to an individual associated with someone accused of being an operative for Islamic Jihad in Israel. The delayed-notice provision allowed investigators to conduct the search without fear of compromising an ongoing wiretap on the target and several of the confederates. The target was later charged and notified of the search warrant.

During an investigation into a nationwide organization that distributes marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine, the court issued a delayed notice warrant to search the residence in which agents seized in excess of 225 kilograms of drugs. The organization involved relied heavily on the irregular use of cell phones, and usually discontinued the use of cell phones after a seizure of the drugs and drug proceeds, making continued telephone interception difficult. Interceptions after the delayed notice seizure indicated that the suspects thought other drug dealers had stolen their drugs, and none of the telephones intercepted were disposed of, and no one in the organization discontinued their use of telephones. The government was able to prevent these drugs from being sold, without disrupting the larger investigation.

Section 214. Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA.


Allows the United States to obtain a FISA pen register order by certifying that the resulting information would be relevant to an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.


"The amendment significantly eviscerates the constitutional rationale for the relatively lax requirements that apply to foreign intelligence surveillance." [EPIC, Mar. 19, 2003]


Section 214 streamlined the process for obtaining pen registers under FISA. It preserved the existing court-order requirement. Now, as before, law enforcement cannot install a pen register unless it applies for and receives permission from the FISA court.

Section 214 goes further to protect privacy than the Constitution requires. The Supreme Court has long held that law enforcement is not constitutionally required to obtain court approval before installing a pen register.

Under long-settled Supreme Court precedent, the use of pen registers does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As such, the Constitution does not require that law enforcement obtain court approval before installing a pen register. This is so because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties," and "when he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).

Section 214 explicitly safeguards First Amendment rights. It requires that any "investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."

A pen register is a device that can track routing and addressing information about a communication - for example, which numbers a particular telephone dials. Pen registers are not used to collect the content of communications.

Whether the Department has used section 214 is classified. Details about its use were provided to the House Judiciary Committee on May 29, 2003.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 215. Access to business records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.


: Allows the FISA court, in an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, to issue an ex parte order requiring the production of any tangible things.


"Many [people] are unaware that their library habits could become the target of government surveillance. In a free society, such monitoring is odious and unnecessary. . . The secrecy that surrounds section 215 leads us to a society where the 'thought police' can target us for what we choose to read or what Websites we visit." [ACLU, July 22, 2003]


The library habits of ordinary Americans are of no interest to those conducting terrorism investigations. However, historically terrorists and spies have used libraries to plan and carry out activities that threaten our national security. We should not allow libraries to become safe havens for terrorist or clandestine activities.

Obtaining business records is a long-standing law enforcement tactic. Ordinary grand juries for years have issued subpoenas to all manner of businesses, including libraries and bookstores, for records relevant to criminal inquiries.

In a recent domestic terrorism criminal case, a grand jury served a subpoena on a bookseller to obtain records showing that a suspect had purchased a book giving instructions on how to build a particularly unusual detonator that had been used in several bombings. This was important evidence identifying the suspect as the bomber.

In the 1997 Gianni Versace murder case, a Florida grand jury subpoenaed records from public libraries in Miami Beach.

In the 1990 Zodiac gunman investigation, a New York grand jury subpoenaed records from a public library in Manhattan. Investigators believed that the gunman was inspired by a Scottish occult poet, and wanted to learn who had checked out his books.

Section 215 authorized the FISA court to issue similar orders in national-security investigations. It contains a number of safeguards that protect civil liberties.

Section 215 requires FBI agents to get a court order. Agents cannot use this authority unilaterally to compel any entity to turn over its records. FISA orders are unlike grand jury subpoenas, which are requested without court supervision.

Section 215 has a narrow scope. It can only be used (1) "to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person"; or (2) "to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." It cannot be used to investigate ordinary crimes, or even domestic terrorism.

Section 215 preserves First Amendment rights. It expressly provides that the FBI cannot conduct investigations "of a United States person solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

Section 215 provides for congressional oversight. Every six months, the Attorney General must "fully inform" Congress on how it has been implemented.

On October 17, 2002, the House Judiciary Committee issued a press release indicating it is satisfied with the Department's use of section 215: "The Committee's review of classified information related to FISA orders for tangible records, such as library records, has not given rise to any concern that the authority is being misused or abused."

There is much misinformation - even disinformation - about the supposed use of section 215 at libraries.

On November 3, 2002, the Hartford Courant alleged that the FBI installed software on computers at the Hartford Public Library that lets agents track a person's use of the Internet and email messages. The article even said that individuals' library use could be surveilled even if they weren't suspected of being a terrorist. In reality, the FBI obtained a single search warrant to copy the hard drive of a specific computer that had been used to hack into a business computer system in California for criminal purposes. No software was installed on that or any other computer in the library. The Hartford Courant has retracted the story in full.

Section 215 actually is more protective of privacy than the authorities for ordinary grand jury subpoenas.

A court must explicitly authorize the use of section 215 to obtain business records. By contrast, a grand jury subpoena is typically issued without any prior judicial review or approval.

Section 215 expressly protects the First Amendment, unlike federal grand jury subpoenas.

Section 215 can only be used, in investigations of U.S. persons, to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. A grand jury can obtain business records in investigations of any federal crime.

The requirement that recipients of these orders keep them confidential is based on "national security letter" statutes, which have existed for decades. (An NSL is a type of administrative subpoena used in certain national-security investigations.)

The details of FISA-related investigations, including requests for business records, are classified. Classified details about the use of section 215 were provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 29, 2002, in response to a request by the House Committee on the Judiciary, and to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 7, 2003, in response to a request by the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

The new tool improved on FISA's original business-records authority in a number of respects:

It expanded the types of entities that can be compelled to disclose information. Under the old provision, the FBI could obtain records only from "a common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility or vehicle rental facility." The new provision contains no such restrictions.

It expanded the types of items that can be requested. Under the old authority, the FBI could only seek "records." Now, the FBI can seek "any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)."

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 216. Modification of authorities relating to use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.


Amends the pen register/trap and trace statute (1) to clarify that it applies to Internet communications, and (2) to allow for a single order that is valid across the country.


"Section 216 would worsen the problem by giving the FBI access to communications of non-targets and to portions of the target's communications to which it is not entitled under the court order it obtained. The 'trust us, we're the government' solution the FBI proposes is entirely unacceptable and inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment." [ACLU, Oct. 23, 2001]


For years, law enforcement has used pen registers to track which numbers a particular telephone dials. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123. Before the USA PATRIOT Act, it was not clear that they could be used to gather the same routing and addressing information about Internet communications.

Section 216 updated the law to the technology. It ensures that law enforcement will be able to collect non-content information about terrorists' communications regardless of the media they use.

Section 216 also allows courts to issue pen-register orders that are valid across the country. As a result, law enforcement no longer needs to waste precious time by applying for new orders each time an investigation leads to another jurisdiction.

Section 216 preserved all of the law's pre-existing standards. As before, law enforcement must get court approval before installing a pen register. And as before, law enforcement must show that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing investigation.

In fact, section 216 enhanced the privacy protections in the pen-register statute. It made explicit that anyone using a pen register has an affirmative obligation to avoid the collection of content.

The Department is committed to complying with the Act's mandate that pen registers not be used to capture content. On May 24, 2002, the Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum instructing field offices to: (1) minimize any possible collection of content; (2) refrain from using any content that may be acquired inadvertently; and (3) coordinate with Department headquarters about what constitutes content.

Department field investigators and prosecutors have used section 216 in a number of terrorism and other important criminal cases.

Section 216 was used in the investigation of the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Danny Pearl, to obtain information that proved critical to identifying some of the perpetrators.

Section 216 was used in a case where two unknown individuals, using a U.S.-based email account, threatened to kill executives at a company in another country unless they were paid a hefty ransom. The use of a pen register enabled Department investigators to provide the foreign authorities with critical information about the suspects' identities - which led to their prompt apprehension overseas.

Investigators also have used section 216 to collect routing information about the Internet communications of (1) terrorist conspirators; (2) at least one major drug distributor; (3) thieves who obtained victims' bank-account information and stole the money; (4) a four-time murderer; and (5) a fugitive who fled on the eve of trial using a fake passport.

A pen register is a device that can track routing and addressing information about a communication - for example, which numbers a particular telephone dials. Pen registers are not used to collect the content of communications.

Under long-settled Supreme Court precedent, the use of pen registers does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As such, the Constitution does not require that law enforcement obtain court approval before installing a pen register. This is so because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties," and "when he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).

The law provides for robust oversight of law enforcement's use of pen registers. The pen register statute has always required that a report be made to Congress every year as to its use. In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act added a requirement that law enforcement report to the supervising court anytime it uses its own pen register to collect Internet information.

Section 217. Interception of computer trespasser communications.


Allows victims of computer-hacking crimes to request law-enforcement assistance in monitoring trespassers on their computers.


"The new law places the determination solely in the hands of law enforcement and the system owner or operator. . . . [T]he amendment has little, if anything, to do with legitimate investigations of terrorism." [EPIC, Mar. 19, 2003]


The law has always recognized the right of landowners to ask law enforcement to help expel people who illegally trespass on their property.

Section 217 made the law technology-neutral, placing cyber-intruders on the same footing as physical intruders. Now, hacking victims can seek law-enforcement assistance to combat hackers, just as burglary victims have been able to invite officers into their homes to catch burglars.

Prior to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the law prohibited computer service providers from sharing with law enforcement that hackers had broken into their systems.

Computer operators are not required to involve law enforcement if they detect trespassers on their systems. Section 217 simply gives them the option of doing so.

Section 217 preserves the privacy of law-abiding computer users. Officers cannot agree to help a computer owner unless (1) they are engaged in a lawful investigation; (2) there is reason to believe that the communications will be relevant to that investigation; and (3) their activities will not acquire the communications of non-hackers.

This provision has played a key role in a number of terrorism investigations, national-security cases, and investigations of other serious crimes.

Section 217 is extremely helpful when computer hackers launch massive "denial of service" attacks - which are designed to shut down individual web sites, computer networks, or even the entire Internet.

The definition of "computer trespasser" does not include an individual who has a contractual relationship with the service provider. Thus, for example, America Online could not ask law enforcement to help monitor a hacking attack on its system that was initiated by one of its own subscribers.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 218. Foreign intelligence information.


Encourages an integrated antiterrorism campaign by allowing the use of FISA whenever "a significant purpose" of the investigation is foreign intelligence.


"It permits the FBI to conduct a secret search or to secretly record telephone conversations for the purpose of investigating crime even though the FBI does not have probable cause of crime. The section authorizes unconstitutional activity - searches and wiretaps in non-emergency circumstances - for criminal activity with no showing of probable cause of crime." [ACLU, Oct. 23, 2001]


Before the USA PATRIOT Act, a perceived metaphorical "wall" often inhibited vital information sharing and coordination. Intelligence investigators were concerned about sharing information with, and seeking advice from, law enforcement investigators and prosecutors. There was a fear that such sharing and consultation could mean that they would not be able to obtain or continue FISA coverage.

Previously, courts had ruled that FISA could be used only when foreign intelligence was the "primary purpose" of an investigation.

Section 218 expressly permitted the full coordination between intelligence and law enforcement that is vital to protecting the nation's security. Now, FISA can be used whenever foreign intelligence is a "significant purpose" of a national security investigation. Moreover, section 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act specifically permits intelligence investigators to consult with federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against threats from foreign powers and their agents.

Generally, a surveillance or search under FISA can be ordered only if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.

This provision already is producing important dividends in the war on terror. The Department recently obtained the indictment of Sami al-Arian, an alleged member of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cell in Tampa, Florida.

PIJ is alleged to be one of the world's most violent terrorist outfits. It is responsible for murdering over 100 innocent people, including Alisa Flatow, a young American killed in a bus bombing near the Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom.

Section 218 enabled criminal investigators finally to obtain and consider the full range of evidence of the PIJ operations in which al-Arian allegedly participated.

The Department has issued several new directives that have fostered cooperation among national-security and law-enforcement personnel.

The Attorney General instructed all U.S. Attorneys to review intelligence files to discover whether there was a basis for bringing criminal charges against the subjects of intelligence investigations. More than 5,000 files have been reviewed as part of this process. Information from this review has been used to open many criminal investigations.

The Attorney General directed every U.S. Attorney to develop a plan to monitor terrorism and intelligence investigations, and to ensure that information about terrorist threats is shared with other agencies and that criminal charges are considered.

In November of last year, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review upheld in full section 218, as well the Department's procedures to implement it.

The court expressly held "that FISA as amended is constitutional because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISCR 2002).

The old "primary purpose" standard was derived from a number of court decisions, including United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). That standard was formally established in written Department guidelines in July 1995. While information could be "thrown over the wall" from intelligence officials to prosecutors, the decision to do so always rested with national-security personnel - even though law-enforcement agents are in a better position to determine what evidence is pertinent to their criminal case. The old legal rules discouraged coordination, and created what the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review calls "perverse organizational incentives." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.

On March 6, 2002, the Department issued guidelines that expressly authorized - and indeed required - coordination between intelligence and law enforcement. These revised procedures were approved in full by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review on November 18, 2002. In December 2002, the Department issue field guidance with respect to the March 2002 procedures and the Court of Review's decision.

In addition to upholding the Department's revised procedures, the Court of Review also noted that the old "wall" standards were not required even prior to the USA PATRIOT Act. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723-27, 735.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 219. Single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism.


Allows courts to issue search warrants that are valid nationwide in terrorism investigations.


Under prior law, a court could only issue a search warrant authorizing searches within its own district. That created unnecessary delays and burdens when investigating terrorist networks, which often span a number of judicial districts.

Section 219 eliminated those time-consuming loopholes. Now, a court in a district where terrorism-related activities have occurred, upon a showing of probable cause, may issue search warrants that are valid within or outside the district.

Section 219 preserved all of the pre-existing standards governing the availability of search warrants. Law enforcement still is required to demonstrate, and courts still must find, probable cause that criminal activity is afoot.

Section 219 has made available resources that otherwise would have been devoted to administrative tasks, thereby maximizing the law enforcement personnel available to investigate terrorists.

This new tool has been used in a number of important terrorism cases. For example, section 219 enabled prosecutors in Virginia to obtain a single search warrant to simultaneously search multiple offices of affiliated charities in two different states. Such coordination is extremely important in cases where one entity may be able to warn another of an impending search.

Section 220. Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.


Allows courts with jurisdiction over the offense to issue search warrants for communications stored by providers anywhere in the country.


Under previous law, some courts declined to issue search warrants for email stored on servers in other districts. Requiring investigators to obtain warrants in distant jurisdictions has delayed many time-sensitive investigations. It also placed an enormous administrative burden on districts in which major Internet service providers are located (such as E.D. Va. and N.D. Cal.).

Section 220 allows courts to issue search warrants for electronic evidence outside the district where they are located. Now, courts can compel evidence directly, without requiring the intervention of agents, prosecutors, and judges in the districts where major ISPs are located.

Section 220 has made available resources that otherwise would have been devoted to administrative tasks, thereby maximizing the law enforcement personnel available to investigate terrorists.

This new tool has been used in a number of important terrorism cases. For example, one section 220 search warrant was used in a case in one state regarding an individual who had set up a website promoting jihad for an organization in another state. The judge where the case was being brought, who was most familiar with the case, was able to sign the search warrant.

The enhanced ability to obtain this information quickly also has proved invaluable in several sensitive non-terrorism investigations, including: (1) the tracking of a fugitive; and (2) a hacker who stole a company's trade secrets and then extorted money from the company.

This provision can only be used by courts with jurisdiction over the investigation.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 223. Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures.


: Creates a cause of action and authorizes money damages against the United States if officers disclose sensitive information without authorization.



There have been no administrative disciplinary proceedings or civil actions initiated under section 223 of the Act for unauthorized disclosures of intercepts.

This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.

Section 319. Forfeiture of funds in United States interbank accounts.


Permits the forfeiture of funds held in United States interbank accounts.


Section 319 allows the government to seize funds subject to forfeiture, which are located in a foreign bank account, by authorizing the seizure of the foreign bank's funds that are held in a correspondent U.S. account.

This is true regardless of whether or not the money in the correspondent account is directly traceable to the money held in the foreign bank account.

The Department has used section 319 in several significant cases.

On January 18, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted James Gibson for various offenses, including conspiracy to commit money laundering, and mail and wire fraud. Gibson, a lawyer, allegedly defrauded his clients, numerous personal injury victims, of millions of dollars by fraudulently structuring settlements. Gibson fled to Belize, depositing some of the proceeds from the scheme in two Belizean banks. The Department's efforts to recover the proceeds initially proved unsuccessful. But following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, section 319 was used to serve a seizure warrant on the Belizean bank's interbank account in the United States. The remaining funds were recovered.

In December 2001, the Department also used section 319 to recover almost $1.7 million in funds. This money will be used to compensate the victims of the defendant's fraudulent scheme.

Section 373. Illegal money transmitting businesses.


Makes it unlawful to run an unlicensed foreign money transmittal business, and eliminates prior requirement that the defendant have known about the state licensing requirement.


Section 373 has enhanced the government's ability to crack down on unlicensed foreign money-transmittal businesses - which terrorists and their supporters often use to raise funds for terrorist operations.

The Department has used section 373 in a number of important terrorism and national-security cases.

On April 30, 2002, a federal jury in Boston convicted Mohamed Hussein for running a foreign money transmittal business (Barakaat North America, Inc.) without a license in violation of section 373. The al-Barakaat network was affiliated with and received funding from al Qaeda. In 2000 and 2001, after the Hussein brothers ignored Massachusetts's warning that their business needed to be licensed, nearly $3 million was wired from his Boston bank account to the United Arab Emirates. On July 22, 2002, Mohammed Hussein was sentenced to one and a half years in prison, to be followed by two years of supervised release.

Fourteen out of 15 defendants have pled guilty to charges stemming from an illegal money transmitting business based in the Eastern District of New York, involving funds sent to Yemen, including over $1 million sent just in March 2002. The final defendant is a fugitive. The lead defendant, who ran the money-transmitting operation, was sentenced to serve 63 months in federal prison. Consensually monitored telephone calls made during the investigation show that this case has had a major deterrent effect on other hawala operators in the Brooklyn area.

On December 17, 2002, three defendants were indicted in connection with an illegal money transmitting business based in the Northern District of New York, which allegedly sent $486,000 to Yemen.

Two individuals have been charged with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business in Kentucky. On November 1, 2002, one of the defendants was convicted of transferring over $594,000 out of the United States.

Section 412. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorists; habeas corpus; judicial review.


Requires the detention of aliens who are certified as threats to the national security, pending their removal from the United States.


"Suspects convicted of no crime may be detained indefinitely in 6 month increments without meaningful judicial review." [ACLU, Feb. 11, 2003]


Section 412 allows the government, with extensive judicial supervision, temporarily to detain terrorist aliens until they are removed from the country. It is the equivalent of denying bail to a criminal defendant. Section 412 ensures that terrorists are not released to live among the people they seek to harm.

Law-abiding Americans have nothing to fear from section 412. It applies only to aliens who engage in terrorism or otherwise pose a severe threat to the national security. And detention lasts only as long as it takes to remove an alien from the U.S.

An extremely narrow class of aliens can be detained under section 412. There must be "reasonable grounds to believe" that the alien: (1) entered the United States to violate espionage or sabotage laws; (2) entered to oppose the government by force; (3) engaged in terrorist activity; or (4) endangers the United States' national security.

Section 412 expressly grants aliens the right to challenge their detention in court. Aliens may file a habeas petition in any federal district court that has jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that detaining aliens may be appropriate in terrorism and other national-security cases: "special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).

Once the Attorney General has taken a certified alien into custody, he has seven days to initiate removal proceedings or file criminal charges. If the Attorney General does neither, he is required to release the alien. If an alien has been detained "solely" under section 412, and his removal is unlikely in the foreseeable future, the Attorney General "may" continue to detain him for additional periods of up to six months. Additional detention periods are authorized only if releasing the alien "will" threaten national security or cause harm to "the community or any person."

As of February 2004, the Attorney General had not used section 412. Numerous aliens who could have been considered have been detained since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. But it has not proven necessary to use section 412 in these particular cases because traditional administrative bond proceedings have been sufficient to detain these individuals without bond. The Department believes that this authority should be retained for use in appropriate situations.

Section 507. Disclosure of educational records.


Allows the Department to seek a court order to obtain educational records that are relevant to an investigation of a grave felony or an act of terrorism.


"This means that the Attorney General may obtain the private educational records of a student involved in the Vieques protests by asserting that the records are relevant to a domestic terrorism investigation." [ACLU, Dec. 6, 2002]


Section 507 has an extremely narrow scope. Records are available only in investigations of the severest terrorist crimes, such as biological-weapons offenses, chemical-weapons offenses, bombing government property, and destroying airliners.

In order to obtain records under section 507, law enforcement is required to apply for and receive a court order. Law enforcement cannot unilaterally compel educational institutions to turn over any information.

Section 507 can only be used if law enforcement certifies to the court that there are "specific and articulable facts" giving reason to believe that the records sought contain information relevant to the terrorism crimes being investigated.

Only high-ranking Department officials - all of whom are Senate-confirmed - are entitled to ask a court to order the disclosure of records. This ensures accountability.

Section 507 requires the Attorney General to issue guidelines to protect confidentiality.

Section 508. Disclosure of information from NCES surveys.


Allows the Department to seek a court order to obtain records from the National Center for Educational Statistics that are relevant to an investigation of a grave felony or an act of terrorism.


Section 508 has an extremely narrow scope. Records are available only in investigations of the severest terrorist crimes, such as biological-weapons offenses, chemical-weapons offenses, bombing government property, and destroying airliners.

In order to obtain records under section 508, law enforcement is required to apply for and receive a court order. Law enforcement cannot unilaterally compel educational institutions to turn over any information.

Section 508 can only be used if law enforcement certifies to the court that there are "specific and articulable facts" giving reason to believe that the records sought contain information relevant to the terrorism crimes being investigated.

Only high-ranking Department officials - all of whom are Senate-confirmed - are entitled to ask a court to order the disclosure of records. This ensures accountability.

Section 508 requires the Attorney General to issue guidelines to protect confidentiality.

Section 801. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems.


Makes it a federal offense to engage in terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems.


The attacks of September 11 confirmed that terrorists are committed to attacking mass transit systems such as airliners. Section 801 created a new offense prohibiting violent offenses against mass transportation systems, vehicles, facilities, or passengers.

The Department recently used section 801 in a case where a female passenger on a cruise ship sent threatening notes to the ship's crew. On May 15, 2003, Kelley Marie Ferguson pleaded guilty to making the threats while on board the Legend of the Seas, en route to Hawaii.

The Department also attempted to use section 801 in the case of "shoebomber" Richard Reid, who now stands convicted of attempting to ignite a bomb hidden in his shoes during an international flight. Reid was sentenced to life imprisonment.

A federal judge dismissed the section 801 charge, concluding that an airliner is not a "vehicle" within the meaning of the statute.

Congress fixed this loophole in section 609 of the "Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003," or "PROTECT Act."

Section 801 prohibits disabling or wrecking a mass transportation vehicle; placing a biological agent or destructive substance or device in a mass transportation vehicle with intent to endanger safety or with reckless disregard for human life; setting fire to or placing a biological agent or destructive substance or device in a mass transportation facility knowing or having reason to know that the activity is likely to disable or wreck a mass transportation vehicle; disabling mass transportation signaling systems; interfering with personnel with intent to endanger safety or with reckless disregard for human life; use of a dangerous weapon with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury to a person on the property of a mass transportation provider; conveying false information about any such offense; and attempt and conspiracy.

The provision carries a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment, or life imprisonment if the crime results in death.

Section 802. Definition of domestic terrorism.


Adds to 18 U.S.C. § 2331 a new definition of "domestic terrorism," similar to the existing definition of "international terrorism."


"Expands terrorism laws to include 'domestic terrorism' which could subject political organizations to surveillance, wiretapping, harassment, and criminal action for political advocacy." [ACLU, Feb. 11, 2003]; The Patriot Act includes "provision that might allow the actions of peaceful groups that dissent from government policy, such as Greenpeace, to be treated as 'domestic terrorism.'" [ACLU fundraising letter, cited by Stuart Taylor, "Backlash Grows against Patriot Act- But Critics Miss the Mark," Fulton County Daily Report, Aug. 5, 2003]


Section 802′s definition of "domestic terrorism" is extremely narrow - indeed, it is much narrower than the pre-existing definition of "international terrorism."

Individuals and groups would be eligible for surveillance under this definition only if they engage in criminal wrongdoing that could result in death. That is so because the definition of "domestic terrorism" is limited to conduct that (1) violates federal or state criminal law and (2) is dangerous to human life.

In addition, law enforcement would have to show that the conduct appears to have been committed with a specified terrorism related intent, and that the conduct occurred primarily in the U.S.

By contrast, an individual would fall within the definition of "international terrorism" whenever he or she commits a crime that involves "violent" conduct.

Section 805. Material support for terrorism.


Strengthens the existing ban on providing material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.


Before the PATRIOT Act, it was not certain that the ban on "material support or resources" encompassed expert advice and assistance - for example, advice provided by a civil engineer on destroying a building, or advice by a biochemist on making a biological agent more lethal.

Section 805 enhanced the material-support statute in several crucial respects, including by making it expressly apply to those who provide expert advice or assistance to terrorists.

Other changes that section 805 made to the material-support statute include: (1) making it apply to acts outside the United States; (2) expanding the list of terrorism crimes for which it is illegal to provide material support; and (3) clarifying that material support includes all types of monetary instruments. Section 810 increased the maximum penalties for providing material support from 10 years to 15 years.

Section 806. Assets of terrorist organizations.


Amends federal forfeiture law to authorize civil forfeiture of assets owned by persons engaged in terrorism.


"Section 806 of the Act could result in the civil seizure of their assets without a prior hearing, and without them ever being convicted of a crime. It is by far the most significant change of which political organizations need to be aware." [ACLU, Dec. 6, 2002]


Forfeiture under section 806 is authorized only in narrow circumstances. The subject must be engaged in conduct that (1) violates federal or state criminal law; (2) involves violence or the risk of death; and (3) is committed with a terrorist intent.

Prior law did not specifically authorize the confiscation of terrorist assets. Instead, forfeiture was authorized only in narrow circumstances for the "proceeds" of murder, arson, and some terrorism offenses. But most terrorism offenses do not yield proceeds, and available forfeiture laws required detailed tracing that is difficult for accounts coming through the banks of countries used by many terrorists.

Section 806 increases our ability to strike at terrorists' economic base by permitting the forfeiture of their property regardless of the source of the property, and regardless of whether the property has actually been used to commit a terrorism offense.

Section 806 is similar to the forfeiture previously available under RICO. In parity with the drug forfeiture laws, the section also authorizes the forfeiture of property used or intended to be used to facilitate a terrorist act, regardless of its source.

As of April 1, 2003, the Department has not yet used section 806. In most cases, it has not been necessary for the Department to seek forfeiture under this provision, because the suspects' assets already had been frozen by the Treasury Department.

Section 812. Post-release supervision of terrorists.


Courts may authorize post-release supervision periods of up to life for persons convicted of terrorism crimes that involved the occurrence or foreseeable risk of death or serious injury


Prior federal law generally capped the maximum period of post-imprisonment supervision for released felons at 3 or 5 years. The drug laws mandate longer supervision periods for persons convicted of certain drug crimes, and specify no upper limit on the duration of supervision, but before the PATRIOT Act there was nothing comparable for terrorism offenses.

Thus, for a released but unreformed terrorist, there was no means of tracking the person or imposing conditions to prevent renewed involvement in terrorist activities beyond a period of a few years.

Section 812 authorized longer supervision periods, including potentially lifetime supervision, for persons convicted of certain terrorism crimes. This permits appropriate tracking and oversight following release of offenders whose involvement with terrorism may reflect lifelong ideological commitments.

In order to qualify for post-release supervision under section 812, one must have committed a specified terrorism-related crime, and the offense must have resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious injury.


4.Protect america act myths.

In August, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Protect America Act of 2007, which modified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to give our intelligence community necessary tools to acquire important information about our enemies.

Passed with bipartisan support in the House and the Senate, the Act restores FISA to its original focus of protecting the civil liberties of Americans, while not acting as an obstacle to conducting foreign intelligence surveillance on targets located in foreign countries. But this new statute is a temporary and narrowly focused measure to deal with the most immediate shortcomings in the law. It is essential that Congress make the Protect America Act permanent and pass legislation to provide meaningful liability protection to those alleged to have assisted our Nation following the 9/11 attacks. Today, the House Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing on FISA. The following are key myths about FISA amendments in the Protect America Act, and the facts that refute them:


: The Protect America Act of 2007 eliminates civil liberty protections under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).



The new law simply makes clear - consistent with the intent of the Congress that enacted FISA in 1978 - that our intelligence community should not have to get bogged down in a court approval process to gather foreign intelligence on targets located in foreign countries. It does not change the strong protections FISA provides to Americans in the United States - surveillance directed at people in the United States continues to require court approval as it did before.



When FISA was enacted 30 years ago, the law did not generally require a court order to obtain foreign intelligence information from a target located outside the United States.

The mechanism Congress used to identify which government activities required a court order under FISA was a careful and complex definition of the term "electronic surveillance," framed in reference to the specific communications technologies used when the law was enacted in 1978.

Telecommunications technologies have changed radically since 1978, and those changes have upset the careful balance established by Congress. As a result, prior to the Protect America Act of 2007, the government was often required to obtain a court order before collecting foreign intelligence on targets in foreign countries.



The Protect America Act restores FISA to its original focus of protecting the rights of Americans within the United States while clarifying the definition of "electronic surveillance" to make clear that - as was the intent when Congress drafted the law - a court order is not required to target persons located overseas.


: The Protect America Act gives the Federal government new powers to target people in the United States for warrantless surveillance.



The Protect America Act leaves untouched the strong protections FISA provides to Americans in the United States - electronic surveillance targeting a person in the U.S. required a court order before the Protect America Act, and that requirement remains in place today.



The Protect America Act does not authorize "domestic wiretapping," and our intelligence professionals are not using the new law either to acquire domestic-to-domestic communications or to target the communications of persons in the United States.



If a foreign target communicates with someone in the United States and the communication involves terrorism or foreign intelligence, the new law remains consistent with the intent of the old law - intelligence professionals can intercept that communication without a court order. As the President has said, "If there are people inside our country who are talking with al Qaeda, we want to know about it."



FISA has always been designed to allow the executive branch to monitor the communications of those in foreign countries planning to harm our Nation, and the Protect America Act merely restores the law to its original intent by accounting for changes in technology.


: The Protect America Act allows the government to target Americans in the United States under the guise of surveilling a person located overseas - a practice known as "reverse targeting."



"Reverse targeting" was, and remains, prohibited by law.



The provisions of FISA that protect against this practice remain unchanged by the Protect America Act. The law excludes from the category of "electronic surveillance," and thus from the FISA warrant requirement, only surveillance directed at individuals reasonably believed to be in foreign countries.



"Reverse targeting" constitutes electronic surveillance and thus generally requires a court order under FISA. Nothing in the Protect America Act changes this.



"Reverse targeting" makes little sense as a matter of intelligence tradecraft. If the government believes a person in the United States is a terrorist, it is more useful to obtain a court order to collect all of the person's communications than to conduct surveillance on that person by listening only to a fragment of the person's calls to individuals overseas.


: Requiring intelligence operatives to get a court order before collecting foreign intelligence on overseas targets will not hinder the government's ability to collect intelligence.



According to Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, the delays caused by applying for warrants before collecting foreign intelligence from overseas targets meant our intelligence community was "missing a significant amount of foreign intelligence that we should be collecting to protect our country."



Requiring intelligence professionals to apply for and wait on a court order before gathering vital intelligence from overseas targets can prevent the swift gathering of intelligence necessary to identify and provide warning of threats to our country.



A mandatory court-approval process also requires the intelligence community to divert scarce intelligence experts to the time-consuming process of compiling court submissions.


: The Protect America Act authorizes the executive branch to conduct physical searches of domestic mail, computers, or the homes of Americans without a warrant.



The Protect America Act does not authorize physical searches of the homes, personal belongings, or computers of individuals in the United States, or the opening of domestic mail without a court order, and our intelligence professionals are not using the Act to conduct such searches.



Critics are misreading provisions of the law that allow the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to direct communications service providers and similar private entities to assist in authorized foreign intelligence activities targeting individuals located outside the United States. The Act safeguards against abuse of this provision by allowing these private entities to challenge any such directive in the FISA Court.


: The Protect America Act would allow the government to obtain, without a warrant or any court approval, the business records of Americans in the United States.



The Protect America Act does not authorize the collection of most business records, such as medical or library records.



The Executive Branch will not use the Act to acquire any business records of Americans in the United States.


: The Protect America Act allows the intelligence community to intercept communications without any oversight.



Under the Protect America Act, the Attorney General is required to submit for review to the FISA Court the procedures by which the Federal government determines that the authorized acquisitions of foreign intelligence do not constitute electronic surveillance requiring court approval under FISA.


Congress will be able to see for itself that the law is being implemented responsibly and as intended. The Administration has committed to informing the full membership of the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of acquisitions authorized under the Protect America Act, and of the reviews the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will conduct to assess compliance by the implementing agencies.

3.Historical suspension of habeus corpus.

Habeus corpus (the suspension thereof) is a prime veiw of evidence for martial law. Let's debunk this shall we?

Quoted by

On Oct. 17, 2006, President Bush signed a law suspending the right of habeas corpus to persons "determined by the United States" to be an "enemy combatant" in the Global War on Terror. President Bush's action drew severe criticism, mainly for the law's failure to specifically designate who in the United Stateswill determine who is and who is not an "enemy combatant."

"What, really, a time of shame this is..."

To President Bush's support for the law -- the

Military Commissions Act of 2006 -- and its suspension of writs of habeas corpus, Jonathan Turley, professor of constitutional law at George Washington University stated, "What, really, a time of shame this is for the American system. What the Congress did and what the president signed today essentially revokes over 200 years of American principles and values."[8]

But it was not the first time.

In fact, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was not the first time in the history of the U.S. Constitution that its guaranteed right to writs of habeas corpus has been suspended by an action of the President of the United States. In the early days of the U.S. Civil War President Abraham Lincoln suspended writs of habeas corpus. Both presidents based their action on the dangers of war, and both presidents faced sharp criticism for carrying out what many believed to be an attack on the Constitution. There were, however, both similarities and differences between the actions of Presidents Bush and Lincoln.

What is a Writ of Habeas Corpus?

A writ of habeas corpus is a judicially enforceable order issued by a court of law to a prison official ordering that a prisoner be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or not that prisoner had been lawfully imprisoned and, if not, whether he or she should be released from custody. A habeas corpus petition is a petition filed with a court by a person who objects to his own or another's detention or imprisonment. The petition must show that the court ordering the detention or imprisonment made a legal or factual error. The right of habeas corpus is the constitutionally bestowed right of a person to present evidence before a court that he or she has been wrongly imprisoned.

Where Our Right of Habeas Corpus Comes From

The right of writs of habeas corpus are granted in Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution, which states, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

Bush's Suspension of Habeas Corpus

President Bush suspended writs of habeas corpus through his support and signing into law of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006. The bill grants the President of the United States almost unlimited authority in establishing and conducting military commissions to try persons held by the U.S., and considered to be "unlawful enemy combatants" in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition, the Act suspends the right of "unlawful enemy combatants" to present, or to have presented in their behalf, writs of habeas corpus. [9]

Specifically, the Act states, "No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."

Importantly, the Military Commissions Act does not affect the hundreds of writs for habeas corpus already filed in federal civilian courts on behalf of persons held by the unlawful enemy combatants. The Act only suspends the accused person's right to present writs of habeas corpus until after their trial before the military commission has been completed. As explained in a

White House Fact Sheet on the Act, "... our courts should not be misused to hear all manner of other challenges by terrorists lawfully held as enemy combatants in wartime."

Lincoln's Suspension of Habeas Corpus

Along with a declaring martial law, President Abraham Lincoln ordered the suspension of the constitutionally protected right to writs of habeas corpus in 1861, shortly after the start of the

American Civil War. At the time, the suspension applied only in Maryland and parts of the Midwestern states. [10]

In response to the arrest of Maryland secessionist John Merryman by Union troops, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Roger B. Taney defied Lincoln 's order and issued a writ of habeas corpus demanding that the U.S. Military bring Merryman before the Supreme Court. When Lincoln and the military refused to honor the writ, Chief Justice Taney in

Ex-parte MERRYMAN declared Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus unconstitutional. Lincoln and the military ignored Taney's ruling. [11]

On Sept. 24, 1862, President Lincoln issued a proclamation suspending the right to writs of habeas corpus nationwide.

"Now, therefore, be it ordered, first, that during the existing insurrection and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, all Rebels and Insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to Rebels against the authority of United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military Commission:"

Additionally, Lincoln's proclamation specified whose rights of habeas corpus would be suspended:

"Second. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority of by the sentence of any Court Martial or Military Commission."

In 1866, after the end of the Civil War, the Supreme Court officially restored habeas corpus throughout the nation and declared military trials illegal in areas where civilian courts were again able to function.

Differences and Similarities

Recalling that the Constitution allows for the suspension of habeas corpus when "Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it," let's consider some of the differences and similarities between the actions of Presidents Bush and Lincoln.

Presidents Bush and Lincoln both acted to suspend habeas corpus under the powers granted to them as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Military during a time of war.

President Lincoln acted in the face of an armed rebellion within the United States - the U.S. Civil War. President Bush's action was a response to the Global War on Terrorism, considered to have been triggered by the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and the Pentagon. Both presidents, however, could cite "Invasion" or the much broader term "public Safety" as constitutional triggers for their actions.

President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus unilaterally, while President Bush's suspension of habeas corpus was approved by Congress through the Military Commissions Act.

President Lincoln's action suspended the habeas corpus rights of U.S. citizens. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, signed by President Bush, stipulates that the right of habeas corpus should be denied only to aliens "detained by the United States."

Both suspensions of habeas corpus applied only to persons held in military prisons and tried before military courts. The habeas corpus rights of persons tried in civilian courts were not affected.

Certainly the suspension -- even if temporary or limited -- of any right or freedom granted by the U.S. Constitution is a momentous act that should be carried out in only in the face of dire and unanticipated of circumstances. Circumstances like civil wars and terrorist attacks are certainly both dire and unanticipated. But whether one or both, or neither warranted the suspension of the right of writs of habeas corpus remains open for debate.

Conclusion:the suspension of Habeus corpus has happened before and it does not affect us civilians, nor does it indicate martial law. Martial law is nowhere near being declared, and FEMA camps do not exist.

MUERTOS BLOG: Ron Paul Promotes Fraudulent "Petition" on Climate Change.

Author: Clock
Date: Mar 28, 2013 at 17:21

I am not Muertos and I do not know him. I am simply reposting these articles because I had found them on the Internet Wayback Machine. Do not contact me when it comes to this blog, I am not its author and my views are not necessarily his. REPEAT: I AM NOT MUERTOS.


This blog is going to be about Ron Paul and global warming. As soon as you take on either one of those topics you know right off the bat that you're in for a bruising. Putting them both together and you're going to ruffle some feathers for sure.
The main point of this blog is this: Ron Paul is pushing lies about climate change, and anyone who believes him is being duped.
The term "polarizing figure" is custom-made for Ron Paul. Chances are, unless you were previously a Libertarian, the U.S. Congressman (ostensibly a Republican) from the 14th District of Texas first came to your attention in 2007 or so, when he began running for the 2008 Republican nomination. Congressman Paul was noteworthy at that time for being the only Republican candidate to be critical of George W. Bush's Iraq war, which made him very attractive both to the sizable number of anti-Bush Republicans, and also independents who rejected the Democrats but couldn't bring themselves to line up with the likes of John McCain, Mike Huckabee or (God forbid) Willard "Mitt" Romney.
Paul never had a snowball's chance in Hell of getting near the Republican nomination, but he made a lot of waves. Along the way he also became the favored candidate of conspiracy theorists, most notably 9/11 Truthers ("Twoofers") and people opposed to the current federal monetary system, especially the U.S. Federal Reserve. Why is Paul a darling of the conspiracy crowd? Well, for such views as the following, printed over a course of 30 years in his newsletters which first debuted in 1978. (My source is a National Review article linked here [1]).

• Urging readers in 1990 to leave major cities for rural retreats because of a coming "race war."
• The 1992 Los Angeles riots, sparked over public outrage about the acquittal of the white police officers in the videotaped Rodney King beating, ended "when it came time for the blacks to pick up their welfare checks."
• Referring to the national holiday of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday as national "Hate Whitey Day."
• Fostering conspiracy theories claiming that the world is secretly controlled by the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission, despite not a shred of evidence that either claim is true.
Now Ron Paul is turning his ire on people who believe that global warming is real and is caused by the activities of human beings--a scientific fact supported by undeniable evidence and the overwhelming consensus of climatologists. On Paul's website, on June 14, 2009, Paul lays out the case for "31,478 American scientists" who have supposedly signed a petition who allegedly claim:
"There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth's atmosphere and disruption of the Earth's climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientific evidence that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide produce many beneficial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the Earth."
There's just one problem. The "petition" is a fabrication which was debunked more than a decade ago.
What Ron Paul is referring to is the infamous "Oregon Petition," a public relations stunt started in 1998 by a group called the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, whose acronym, OISM, is a dyslexic version of OMSI, the well-respected Oregon Museum of Science and Industry in Portland. OISM has nothing to do with OMSI, but they're probably hoping you mix up letters easily. OISM is a conservative group concerned about "socialism in public schools" which also happens to believe that climate change is a liberal conspiracy. In 1998--yes, twelve years and two Presidential administrations ago--OISM circulated a "petition" signed by a varying number of scientists (usually 19,000, 30,000 or Ron Paul's current number, 31,478) claiming that they agree with the position that there is no scientific basis for global warming.
Who are these "scientists?" You may recognize some of their names: Perry S. Mason, Michael J. Fox, and John C. Grisham. Sound like more like a fictional lawyer, an 80s actor and a novelist than respected climatologists? Yeah, they are. Most of the "scientists" who supposedly signed the petition are fake. Some of them, such as Geraldine Halliwell, have said they never signed it, yet her name is listed three times under various permutations. Others are dead. Many of the "Ph.D.s" don't have Ph.D.s in anything even remotely related to climate science. W. Kline Bolton, for example, is an M.D. specializing in kidneys. Zhonggang Zeng has a Ph.D., but it's in mathematics--he knows nothing about climate science. Hub Hoagland is a dentist and sometime basketball player. These are climate experts?
I'm not just making this stuff up. You can browse detailed debunkings of the Oregon Petition here and here.
The Oregon Petition was intended, upon its release in 1998, to resemble closely the format of documents put out by the National Academy of Sciences. The NAS was troubled enough by the resemblance to put out a press release stating that they had nothing to do with it. For the past dozen years there have been numerous debunkings of the Petition, and you might think that Paul's latest take on it would correct some of the problems that were so obvious 12 years ago. It didn't. Evidently even basic veracity is not required to achieve the level of holy writ from the unimpeachable Ron Paul. The Oregon Petition, and the write-up offered of it on Paul's website since at least June 2009, is nothing more or less than a lie.
Why is Paul pushing lies on climate change? It probably has something to do with his ideological position, which is so convoluted and difficult to follow that one is never sure, listening to his screeds, whether he's a Libertarian, a Republican or a fascist. (I don't believe he is a fascist, but certainly some of the stuff from his newsletters seems to be in that category). This opacity is probably intentional. If anyone really knew what policies Ron Paul advocated, he wouldn't have any friends left. He coasted through the 2008 campaign allowing conservatives angry at Bush to believe that he was one of them and opposed the Iraq war on principle. Despite not being a 9/11 Truther himself--and I do not believe Ron Paul is a 9/11 Truther--he certainly did little to discourage conspiracy theorists from latching on to him in the mistaken belief that he was sympathetic to their demands to "reopen the investigation" of September 11, presumably to "prove" that it was an inside job. This tack was similar to the one Dennis Kucinich also took, but Kucinich was never more than a temporary crush by the conspiracy crowd; eventually most of them came to understand that he wasn't going to advance their interests.

Can reasonable people disagree on how best to combat climate change? I believe they can, and they should. Only through disagreement and the clash of various opinions can a responsible national and international policy on global warming be hammered out. Can it be denied by reasonable people that science supports the fact that global warming is happening, and that is substantially caused by humans? No, it cannot. [2]

Let me repeat that: the science of climate change is unassailable. [3] Just to make sure there's no mistaking my position, I'll say it a third time: the science that climate change is happening, and that it's caused mostly by human activity, is overwhelming. [4] Why, then, is Ron Paul choosing to advance his disagreement with ideas about climate change mitigation with proven lies and obfuscations like the Oregon Petition? I can't believe that no one in the Ron Paul organization hasn't looked into the matter and discovered the very real problems with the Oregon Petition. If that is the case, there's a major quality control problem in Ron Paul's communications organization. And if it's not, then Paul or someone who speaks for his organization is consciously choosing to push lies at the American public. Why, if Congressman Paul believes that global warming is some sort of "hoax," does he not resort to better evidence to validate his position? Why the lies, the obfuscation?
Ron Paul cannot be taken seriously as a reliable voice on environmental policy. If this is the kind of crap he's going to sink to, then he richly deserves the oblivion to which history will inevitably consign him. I guess that's par for the course for him. What amazes me is that Ron Paul remains so popular, and that so many otherwise reasonable Americans would even listen to anything he has to say.