Skeptic Project

A unified world is exactly what we should all strive towards, but sadly that is not going to be happening anytime soon thanks to all the propaganda against a "unified world." Besides, most people who read the list of the things that the ORIGINAL Illuminati wanted, would certainly agree with them. (Logical people. Not paranoid religious nutjobs.)

A world that is unified is ideal and everyone speaking one language (next to their mother language) to communicate with those from other countries, is once again ideal. A world without religion is far too good to be true, but once again, its an ideal. Behind most conspiracy theories against the Illuminati and etc, you'll find a religious organisation, just like in the 16th-17th century. (The Catholic Church) Nothing has really changed, except that now propaganda can find its way to any house thanks to the internet.

"In your book, what are the prerequisites for political unification? I get the feeling they differ from mine."

This is the best evidence in this thread so far as to why a unified Earth will probably never happen.

"I suppose China's success is evidence against this, but I'm betting their success comes from their massive population rather than their political and economic policies"

Why do so many Chinese live in squalor then?

"Okay, let's drill down to the heart of this. In your book, what are the prerequisites for political unification? I get the feeling they differ from mine."

Considering that I think political unity is always limited, I'll lay out what the specific problem are.

1) Value systems- I'll illustrate with something i'm actively working on. In 1990, as the first Gulf War loomed large in the minds of Western nations, a curious thing occured in the media coverages in two of the major industrial powers- Germany and the United States. See, for Germany the very word for war, "Krieg," is used to sparsely because the very value and ramifications of the concept are very difficult for modern Germans to handle. Germany dug its heals in heavily against the American call for war because Germany not only had a deep running stigma against war, but because they felt that Americans took war far too lightly. A good example comes from issue 37 of Der Spiegel in an article entitled "We Must Be Mature" in which American diplomacy is described as being a "crazy game" that would push Germany into something it would never have done on its own. What does this example show? merely that different populations have very different conceptions of things like the use of force. In fact, one of the failures of the EU has been an inability to create an effective and unified security apparatus. Why? Because Germans especially do not want to commit their troops to wars they don't believe in. Just look at how Spain pulled out of Afghanistan but England did not. This very fundamental pillar of force application blocks unification today and into the future. We just don't value certain concepts the same way.

2) Different populations also see their relationship to the state very differently. In America there seems to be a cringe any time a social welfare program goes into place- or even mentioned! American attitudes towards state-run programs is very different than our European counter parts. Scandinavians notoriously respond to the International Social Survey Program questionaire with the sentiment that they have no problem paying higher taxes. And in my time in France I found that people felt the government had a RESPONSIBILITY to provide health care to the people no matter what the tax rate was. In theocratic countries, the importance is not based on democratic ideals or conceptions of right, but rather upon a theological understanding of the self and the state. Even Iranian protestors have shown themselves to remain in favor or a heavily religious state as opposed to a Western copycat regime. I have been working on cultural foundations of the state, and have found that the relationship between a culture and its government is very specific and not easily transferable. What it means to be an American is based on very different ideals than what it means to be German, for example (if you can't tell by now, I really like Germany).

and 3) The problems of language are in no way trivial. Translation and hermeneutics are remarkably difficult, and to have any semblance of functionality in governance, a common, unified, and fluent language flow must exist. Problem is, this would mean that all people all over the globe would agree on what that language should be. If you asked Parisians they would of course say French! It is the language of diplomacy after all. But if you ask people in the US it should be English! Afterall, America is the greatest country in the world! If you asked the Swiss they'd say "How the fuck should we know? We use three goddamn languages!" Problem is, we cannot have an effective government if there is not a single commonly understood language. Deciding on that language, teaching it, and standardizing it is a whole different set of problems.

And those are only three of the many barriers I see, and ones not easily reversible. Just think about all the small differences that will always set us apart. I think globalizing trade and globalizing values and governance are two remarkably different things. Yes, we can communicate and exchange more freely now than ever, but that doesnt mean we 1) understand each other and 2) we agree. Just remember, even democracy is not seen as a Universal good. Just to those of us who love it.

"Racial mixing seems like it would create cultural homogenization as a side-effect also. Or is your argument that cultural conflict will persist despite increasing exposure to other cultures?"

Well there are still cultural conflicts in SE Europe, Latin America, and parts of europe despite hundreds of years of cultural interaction. Value systems do not homogenize over time, all we have is a discourse against which value systems are defined. There is not only no empirical evidence to support the contrary argument, but no logical reason why. Value systems have not altered to date, and its not likely to do so in the future. These structures are remarkably plastic and constantly change and exchange. Consider that despite years of colonial history, African cultures do not identify with Europeans much less European values. Hell, go to France and you'll see there is still a distinct notion of Algerian-French culture and values and French Culture and values.

"would better translation technology help? Besides that, I read somewhere that 85% of the world already knows how to speak English - it is the language of business. That seems like a pretty good percentage, and my guess is it is still growing. (I can't seem to find hard evidence for or against this claim, though)"

The issue isn't just translation, but understanding as well. Consider this simple example. In English we have the word "humans" and "people" to describe, well, us. In German you have "Volk" "Leute" and "Menschen" which are all used in very nuanced and different ways. And this is just a trivial example. I highly suggest reading Johann von Gottfried Herder's "On Translation" and the "Fragments." YOu can get a synopsis of it on the stanford philosophical dictionary. My point is that language is not just a matter of people being able to speak a language, but in that language being fluently operational across the board.

Other examples of barriers consist of Historical self identification of populations, religious differences (obviously), historical distrust between groups (China and India refuse to cooperate with American and European climate proposals because they have a general feeling that America is trying to keep down competing economies), and so on. Globalization doesn't erase these factors, if anything they just increase the rate at which they occur. I can tell you're really in to international politics and politics in general. If you want I have a whole clusterfuck of readings you might be interested. I think you'll be surprised at the depth of research that exists.

Well I think a unified world would be hard or next to impossible simply because people don't like sharing..........that might sound like an oversimplify-ed statement but think of it this way...............
Lets say hypothetically J Fresco and the Venus project takes off and It works out 100%.........then to celebrate Roxane bakes him a cake then all of a sudden like 100 people want a piece of the cake, well do you think Fresco is really gonna give out HIS cake to 100 people.

> I think a unified world would be hard or next to impossible simply because people
> don't like sharing..

What if you ration instead ?

The benevolent dictator Nanos, of course.

@Nanos
Rationing isn't a bad idea, but in reality its really just a forced version of sharing. I'm not saying sharing isn't bad, I'm just saying most of the problems would fundamentaly come some people not wanting to share.

> Who would do the rationing?

The government..

> Who would decided what a fair amount was?

The workers output :-)

Lets say a community of 100 people produce 1,000 carrots a month.

Lets say that 10% of the people work, so thats 10 workers, producing those 1,000 carrots.

Lets say those 10 workers each work 10 hours a month.

If we start off with equal shares, then everyone gets 10 carrots each.

But, what if only 9 people want to work ?

You increase the wages of the workers to encourage someone to take up the role..

So your workers now get 11 carrots each, and every non-worker gets 8.9 carrots.

And if no one else wants to work, you increase working hours per worker from 10 hours a month to 11 hours

So, if people do the work, then they all get equal shares, if people don't want to do the work and you need to increase the salary/ration to get people to do the job, then some will get more than others.

I'd also suggest letting people trade their rations and build a fee free system to allow that easily, as people will barter and trade anyhow, and its best if you allow that as part of the system as you can then more easily monitor supply demand, and adjust output accordingly. (Eg. if you find people don't need on average more than say 5 carrots each a month and you are producing 10 each per month on average, then cut back on production to say 6 carrots per month..)

> Who would actually want to settle for rationing?

People who currently would get far less I imagine.

> Why would people trust someone else to ration for them?

Because of transparency and because they get more than they got in the old system.

Force me to ration and I'll discover a way to screw you out of your ration.

Why? Because I resent being forced to share when I do so already on my own.

"The UN doesn't do so badly.."

it works remarkably poorly. Consider that the United States has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to stand completely and effectively opposed to UN resolutions- ost notably the 2003 decision to go to war in Iraq. There is no effective executive control in the UN and thus a brilliant example of the power differentials in international relations loans itself to a break down of international institutions. They only work so long as a nation decides it is effective or necessary to do so. However, should that institution stand directly opposed to its intentions there is nothing forcing them to adhere. Look at the veto tract record of the US and Isael in the UN and it becomes immediately clear just how limited such an institution as the UN is. Indeed, its validity was immediately questioned before the First Gulf War in Germany (Der Spiegel "Wir Mussen Erwachsen Werden" issue 34 1990). Member states themselves see the UN's role differently, with the US blatantly ignoring many resolutions (and even the UK is guilty of this repeatedly). And just think about how many human rights violations have gone on in China, a member state, alone since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN in 1948. Now count up all those committed by all other member states and youll see just how far th UN can really go.

"Or when you consider how a product made in China and shipped half way around the world manages to work in the UK with our differing standards, surely this is an example of how governments can agree enough to make practical things work for people."

This proves nothing on international political cooperation, and rather shows you how states will behave in their own interest. The reason Chinese products adhere to UK standards isn't out of some show of goodwill and cooperation, but rather out of a direct need to meet market needs and achieve desirable trade balances. If chinese products did not meet UK standards, the Chinese exports system would lose a market and thus be in an undesirable position. Do you think China would care if UK standards fell? It would certainly make it easier for them to export rapidly. And look to just last couple years when, in the United States, many Chinese produts were found to be in violation of US safetly and health standards. (www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20254745.) Your point rests on a false view of international trade patterns, motives, and outcomes.

"In regard to rationing, it worked pretty well in the UK during WWII:"

It worked in the US too. However, it was the US government, which was elected by the American people, who were doing the rationing at a time of war. Why would a population subject itself to the scarcity of war-time rationing during a period where it was not necessitated by war? And furthermore, why would any given population trust a government it did not support or form to do any such rationing? The logic just doesn't add up. And perhaps the next point may be "well, the people could form the world government" but such a point would ignore the problems I discussed with Domakoto above.

"Does it really matter if government A believes in pink fairies and government B believes in blue fairies, as long as the public can buy potatoes ?"

This clearly misses the point. I suggest a rereading of the points made earlier in this thread.

"Thus our aim should be to make sure that trade is encouraged, as it weakens political power so to speak."

It absolutely does not. Trade only fosters positions of relative advantage. By creating dependence, not interdependence, states forward their own position. China works off the basis of running a export surplus with little importing. It is not in their direct interest to become interdependent, but rather to ensure that they can continue to export at surplus. The empirics are not on your side here. We can readily see that IMF policies are constantly at odds with political motives, for example, and we have seen no change in political power between nations outside the Eurozone (and even then to a remarkably limited degree). This idea that trade will lower political boundaries is based on a remarkable fiction that overlooks the last 60 years of political history.

"Because the majority would get more than they would without rationing, overall that is.

You might give up being able to choose between 10 different coloured Ipods, and instead end up with housing for everyone, including yourself when you get too old to work and afford to pay your rent.."

Your example here is patently irrelevent to international political economy. Indeed, the entire bases of international economic inequality is tha those who do not have enough lack the political power necessary to leverage themselves into positions necessary to bridge the gap. Your position is only possible by an altruistic move made by those with political power on behalf of those without- and again empirics are not on your side. Aide given from industrialized and post-industrial nations to developing countries has not come at the expense of the latter reducing their consumption. Its not those who need that must be convinced, but those who have. And sadly that is not a likely event given the historical patterns that exist. Why would those who live comfortably want to surrender what they have? You rely on altrusitic motives that do not have the necessary relevance in contemporary international affairs. You can't throw historical patterns out to forward your position.

Your example again rests on everyone accepting that kind of scenario- which clearly is not the case. Socialist and Communist systesm attempted to follow that logic, and look at what happened between 1948 and 1991. It wasn't accepted then, it wont be accepted now.

"Trust would be based on experience, if a government successfully ran projects that included rationing, and then told the country it was making it countrywide. If the results of those experiments was positive, eg. people liked it overall, I think people would be inclined to trust.

Not that people on the whole have much choice when it comes to government decisions.."

and here you depend upon anyone agreeing to perform such an experiment. What you have done is tried to build a system that faces countless entry-level problems that are unsovlable by anything you have proposed. Again, what incentives do people who already have plenty encounter by running this experiment? And you again overlook historical precedent and contemproary issues. Value systems are not accepted across cultures. Rationing is not seen as a universal good, but rather an option of desperation. Your position is wonderful in a utopian vacuum where we are allowed to overlook historical reality and contemporary action, but falls apart when we look at the facts. Just because we are talking about politics doesn't mean we're allowed to invent systems willy-nilly.

"Independence though leads more likely to war would you not agree ?"

actually, interdependence leads to more nodes of conflict. Look at the number of armed conflicts that occurred with fewer interactions between geopolitical units and then track it over the last 100 years. You'll find that as we have been able to communicate and exchange that the absolute number of conflicts has increased. The last 100 years have not only seen a rise in the potential for death in wars, but the potential for wars to be waged over greater distance. There is no evidence that armed conflicts are decreasing as we globalize our economy.

"True, but..

If their exports matched their imports, they would be no worse off than if they was independent would they ?"

They would be. By being dependent upon other countries for economic output a country creates a very difficult position. Their own growth is tied to the growth and output of another. So if one country fails, they too are bound to suffer. This is already greatly true as evidenced by the Great Depression which followed on the heals of the first wave of globalized economics. By exporting more than importing, a country creates a capital buildup. By running a trade surplus, China maintains greater control over its economic situation and also create economic-political leverage.

"The best way I see of convincing them, is to become them, as we are already convinced, we just need the ability to exersize power to make it happen"

that's a logical-loop. You have not provided a way for the gap to be bridged except by the gap already being bridged. You're stuck in a fallacy here.

"Everyone dies of old age at some point..

But in the world of business its always a constant battle to keep what you have, so there would be no real difference between fighting others and fighting us, except perhaps instead of the rich living in isolated pockets of the world, they would more easily be able to walk the streets with common people, because the common man would no longer hate them, as their wealth would not be obtained by what is considered unfair means."

This provides us with no out of the problem at hand. Actually, your opening sentence is rather trapped in the logical fallacy that occurred earlier. You have yet to provide the incentive for the haves to compromise their position

"I don't think it was due to not being accepted, but to it not working as well in practice as in theory."

The results of the communist system were not clear in 1948 when the cold war really began, and thus this statement is flawed. It was fundamentally an ideological-power difference and not a question of outcomes. It was only in the 1980s that the cracks really became evident to the non-communist bloc, and in 1990 that the full failure was visible. So how do you account for the entire conflict before that point? And of the immediate negative reaction that followed the 1917 revolution? Evaluate the historical discourse here.

"I don't think it will be particularly difficult to build communities and invite people there for such experiments. (Look at Big Brother TV Programme for example in the UK.)"

This still doesnt answer how the experiment would be accepted by the non-poor. Nor does it look at the question of whether or not all poor people would want to settle for a rationing program. If it was possible for them to rise up the wealth ladder, could you convince them to stay put forever. Plus its one thing to bring people up and an entirely different one to bring people down. You're trying to keep looking at this from a position that doesnt address the key problems here.

"But, even with those with plenty, if the experiments lead to a reduction in crime, an increase in productivity/GDP in the country, more customers with money in their pocket to buy their products, then I think even they would be for it!"

This is just pragmatically at odds with your own logic. How does a rationing economy produce more in terms of wealth and GDP. Provide data for this point- because when we look at those economies built up on this principle (as close as we've come) we find the opposite to ultimately be true.

"It would be like the time when the Wright Brothers had the same kind of debate, with people saying the historical evidence wasn't in their favour for working flight.."

False. Theirs was a question of technological progression and experimentation, but what you are trying to argue is completely different. Anthropological and political research on systems does not occur in the same way engineering does. The wrights weren't trying to bend public opinion, overcome competing value systems, and do away with massively complex interpersonal system that transcends scientific progress. I really wish people would stop trying to make this argument- it makes no sense.

"My hope is that you can point out errors in my/others designs/plans and we can find solutions to correct them, or at the very least, if we cannot, find a way to test them to figure out if they really work or not."

I'm not interested in bettering your system because it is fundamentally in tension with the historical political realities at hand. Personally, I support regionalism and see no reason why anything you have proposed is even remotely pragmatic. What youve done is thrown out a formless idea and provided nothing of substance to convince anyone that its practical in the least. Where are the systems necessary to even implement this. You are relying on faith and limited logical application and not sound, rigorous research and understanding.

> they failed by the way.

These didn't:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Findhorn_Foundation

> There is no evidence that armed conflicts are decreasing as we globalize
> our economy.

What over the last 50 years, is the picture any different ?

More so, is the picture more different in more developed countries being less at war with each other ?

For example, German and England haven't had a war for a while, and it looks likely that peace will continue to exist between us, why is this ?

> By being dependent upon other countries for economic output a country creates
> a very difficult position. Their own growth is tied to the growth and output
> of another. So if one country fails, they too are bound to suffer.

True, but it gives that country an incentive to help its trading partner, rather than trying to be at war with them.

> You have not provided a way for the gap to be bridged except by the gap
> already being bridged.

I would suggest we bridge the gap by building ourselves up economically, from small businesses to large corporations, to get into politics so that one day we are working in parties in charge, and to get into the civil service so we can influence solutions there.

> It was only in the 1980s that the cracks really became evident to
> the non-communist bloc, and in 1990 that the full failure was visible.

Its not entirely clear what specifically was the failures, talking with people who lived during that time, and talking with people during this time in the west, their time actually sounds better than what we have now for the majority..

Its only the minority who appear to be doing well, so I'm not sure if it was actually failing, but instead it could have been broken on purpose to become like the west, with all of the worst that we can offer..

Perhaps we can look at specifics to understand the differences, for example, has homelessness gone up or down under communist rule, compared with similar populations in non-communist countries ?

> Evaluate the historical discourse here.

My interest is in more simplistic aspects that effect the man in the street.

> This still doesnt answer how the experiment would be accepted by the non-poor.

The non-poor rely in part on the poor buying products, such an experiment could see the poor with more money in their pocket, lower crime and thus less wasted resources in society on policing, I think they would all value that.

> If it was possible for them to rise up the wealth ladder, could you convince
> them to stay put forever.

For many, its not possible..

For that it is, the choice would be less stress, less working hours, lower crime, I would find that an acceptable price to pay for less luxuries myself if it could mean I could walk down the road without getting mugged, have more time with my family, and less worry about going bust in business.

So I would end up on a car ferry instead of my own yacht..

> an entirely different one to bring people down.

True, but conflict like that is happening all the time, we would be no different in attacking their lifestyle as the next person trying to put them out of business.

Only instead of wanting to strip them of everything they own, we would only want to take some of their wealth and leave them instead with the same as everyone else, so we wouldn't be quite as unfair as everyone else..

> How does a rationing economy produce more in terms of wealth and GDP

Because resources are not wasted on trivia, but instead invested in production.

> Provide data for this point

I intend to do that at some point, at the moment it is only a lesson in intelligence and logic to imagine this is how it will work. (Lets experiment and see whose right..)

> because when we look at those economies built up on this principle (as close
> as we've come) we find the opposite to ultimately be true.

Can you point me to any references to these examples ?

> Anthropological and political research on systems does not occur in the
> same way engineering does.

In what way does it differ, as it appears the same to me.

> provided nothing of substance to convince anyone that its practical in the least.

My experiences of running a corporation based on profit sharing in a MMORPG must surely count for substance does it not ?

> You are relying on faith and limited logical application and not sound,
> rigorous research and understanding.

I intend to do rigorous research, as there appears a lack of it, but my view is less on faith and more on how I understand things to work, and the limited testing I have seen of such solutions indicate to me their promising nature.

So we might at least agree the need to test our differing solutions yes ?

(As such, I would welcome your input when the times come to help design the testing enviroment so it meets with your approval as best I can to be a fair and just lab setting.)